Two anniversaries just passed with little notice: the release of the Biden Administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the one year anniversary of the congressionally-mandated, bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission (SPC) report. Unlike these anniversaries, the global security environment has been noticeably noisy lately. Both the NPR and the SPC report highlight China, Russia, and North Korea’s threats to the U.S.-led international order, and the growing role of these countries’ nuclear arsenals to advance their ambitions and coerce the United States and its allies.
These concerns are particularly evident in the Indo-Pacific region. China continues its fast-paced nuclear expansion and is expected to reach parity with the U.S. strategic deterrent in the next decade. North Korea has invested in intercontinental ballistic missiles with the potential to threaten the U.S. homeland, and equipped frontline units with low-yield nuclear weapons. These threats necessitate thoughtful consideration of a more concrete U.S. architecture of nuclear options in the Indo-Pacific to counter these adversaries’ advances.
Policymakers must, then, address a key challenge from these adversaries’ nuclear expansion – the threats of limited, low-yield nuclear strikes at the regional level against U.S. and allied forces. China and North Korea could exploit such threats to coerce and blackmail U.S. allies—Japan and South Korea come to mind—which would in turn sow divisions within U.S.-led alliances and force Washington and its allies to back down in a conflict on terms favorable to these adversaries. Ultimately, such a move would test the very credibility of Washington’s defense commitments.
Unfortunately, the current U.S. nuclear theater posture in the Indo-Pacific is practically non-existent, and stands in stark contrast to Chinese and North Korean buildup of regional nuclear capabilities. The incoming second Trump administration, building upon the recommendations of the SPC and taking into account the threat environment presented in both the 2018 and 2022 NPRs, could assess potential options for a future nuclear theater architecture in the Indo-Pacific.
The United States has long neglected its global nuclear theater posture. After the Cold War, Washington withdrew some of its forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Asia, and retired systems such as the nuclear-armed Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile. The current nuclear theater portfolio, concentrated around dual-capable fighter aircraft (DCA) and bombers based in the continental United States (CONUS), is insufficient to address regional nuclear threats from adversaries. The air leg of the nuclear triad has not been on alert for over three decades, minimizing preparedness for potential nuclear crises. Adversary integrated air defense systems and the long transit times required for the air leg to reach the Indo-Pacific from CONUS also strain the status-quo posture. […]
— Read More: www.wnd.com
